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Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS) represents a unique gaming space in which the predictions of human 
rational decision-making can be compared with actual performance. Playing a computerized opponent 
adopting a mixed-strategy equilibrium, participants revealed a non-significant tendency to over-select 
Rock. Further violations of rational decision-making were observed using an inter-trial analysis where 
participants were more likely to switch their item selection at trial n + 1 following a loss or draw at 
trial n, revealing the strategic vulnerability of individuals following the experience of negative rather 
than positive outcome. Unique switch strategies related to each of these trial n outcomes were also 
identified: after losing participants were more likely to ‘downgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by 
Scissors) but after drawing participants were more likely to ‘upgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by 
Paper). Further repetition analysis revealed that participants were more likely to continue their specific 
cyclic item change strategy into trial n + 2. The data reveal the strategic vulnerability of individuals 
following the experience of negative rather than positive outcome, the tensions between behavioural 
and cognitive influences on decision making, and underline the dangers of increased behavioural 
predictability in other recursive, non-cooperative environments such as economics and politics.
The dynamic system represented by game Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS) is both a physical reality in the animal 
world (specifically amongst three species of side-blotched lizards1) and serves as an important paradigm for 
assessing the degree of rational decision making inherent within non-cooperative environments across species 
(e.g.2,3). In a typical RPS game, participants reveal a three-alternative choice at the same time: Rock, Paper or 
Scissors. The winner (and loser) is calculated by the rule Rock wins over Scissors (the Scissors are ‘blunted’), 
Paper wins over Rock (the Rock is ‘covered’) and Scissors wins over Paper (the Paper is ‘cut’). The specific rela-
tionships between elements (non-transitive dominance relations4) dictate a crucial aspect of the game space, in 
that there is no singular strategy that guarantees success (or evolutionarily stable strategy; Maynard-Smith & Price, 
1973, cited in3). As such, when it is played in a potentially infinitely recursive manner, the various responses may 
enjoy periods of temporary dominance and the lack of a definitive strategy becomes particularly apparent when 
children can often serve as formidable opponents to adults5.
One aspect of the game that has received particular interest results from the unique Nash equilibrium of RPS5, 
where “an equilibrium point is a pair of strategies that are best replies to each other, a best reply being a strategy 
that maximizes a player’s payoff, given the strategy chosen by the other player” (3, p. 140). During RPS, players 
should adopt a mixed-strategy equilibrium wherein multiple items are played stochastically2. In other words, each 
of the three items should be played with random distribution but equal probability (33.33%). The disadvantages 
of not following this strategy are made clear by6, who show that if a computer opponent plays one item more 
often than another (e.g., Rock) then human participants will play the appropriate counter-item with increased 
frequency (e.g., Paper). Under this scheme, the computer opponent would be said to be playing a strategy that 
could be dominated and serves as an example of irrational (not to mention evolutionarily unsound3) decision 
making. Therefore, precisely constructed game environments such as RPS supply researchers with a baseline 
against which deviations from rational decision-making may be observed and predicted. As7 (p. 55) state: “equi-
librium strategies specified by game theory provide a precise yardstick to quantify how human behaviors deviate 
from the normative predictions for rational players. One can therefore try to identify factors responsible for the 
discrepancy between the normative predictions and observed behaviors”.
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The first indication of irrationality in RPS comes from the observation that specific items in game systems 
may be naturally favoured. Decision making can be influenced by saliency8, where primary salience refers to 
selecting responses that more readily come to mind (c.f., availability heuristic9) and secondary salience refers to 
adopting a strategy whereby one assume the opponent is operating on the basis of primary salience. Evidence of 
primary salience in RPS comes from10 who reported that across 300 rounds, participants selected Rock 35.66%, 
Paper 32.12% and Scissors 32.23% of the time, and a similar bias for Rock was also reported by4 with Rock 36%, 
Paper 33% and Scissors 32%. Therefore, there might be a simple influence at the item level that draws individuals 
away from adhering to a mixed-strategy equilibrium and, ultimately, rationality3. Similarly, secondary salience 
might also contribute to RPS performance according to the observations of6: my opponent is predominantly 
playing Rock so I will predominantly play Paper. However, such strategies cannot be evolutionarily stable due to 
the recursive nature of the game: eventually an opponent may eventually adjust their strategy according to your 
overplaying of Paper.
Ref.4 also showed that participants implement an apparently successful rule-based strategy of if I win then I 
stay with my current item, if I lose then I shift to a new item (‘win-stay, lose-shift’; see also7, for a similar strategy 
in monkeys). In contrast to the memorial and cognitive demands of the mixed-strategy equilibrium (frequency 
counting three-alternative choices across hundreds of rounds to ensure that each item is played 33.33% of the 
time), tendencies to adopt rules like ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ become “psychologically plausible for human subjects 
with bounded rationality” 4(p. 5). Principles such as Thorndike’s Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1911, cited in11) and 
the matching law (Hernstein, 1961, cited in6), where the proportion of response matches the degree of reinforce-
ment, seem to fit well with an account where participants maintain their current course of action in the light 
of success (‘win-stay’) but change their current course of action in the light of failure (‘lose-shift’; see also12, 
for a similar criterion of progress in the context of problem solving). Although necessary on the basis of limited 
human cognition, predictable consequences as a function of winning (reinforcement; stay) or losing (punishment; 
switch) also run the risk of being dominated. Furthermore, neural activity associated with reinforcement and 
punishment in the context of RPS trial outcome are found throughout the cortex and to a much larger degree 
than previously thought, with additional specific areas distinguishing between win and loss (accumbens, caudial 
ACC and transverse temporal region) and also between stay and switch (medial frontal cortex and caudate13). 
The cortex-encompassing activity associated with trial outcome has the required distributed nature to impact on 
numerous cognitive processes.
However, switch heuristics such as win-stay lose-shift remain underspecified at the level of item selection and 
two additional categories of response change suggest themselves (after4). First, participants may choose to down-
grade their response across trials, defined as selecting the item in trial n + 1 that would have been beaten by their 
item at trial n (e.g., Rock followed by Scissors; also ‘descending’14 or ‘left-shift’15). Alternatively, participants may 
choose to upgrade their response across trials, defined as selecting the item in trial n + 1 that would have beaten 
their item at trial n (e.g., Rock followed by Paper; also ‘ascending’14 or ‘right-shift’15). Due to the cyclical nature 
of the relationships between items (see Fig. 1a) it would be possible to repeat the strategy of upgrading or down-
grading across multiple consecutive trials. Of additional importance are the cognitive implications of draw trials, 
which are also currently underspecified. It may seem reasonable to assume that draw trials should be less arousing 
than win or loss trials and so have less on an impact on subsequent performance, but a recent study provided no 
evidence that this was the case13.
To further investigate the heuristics underlying RPS performance, human participants played 225 rounds of 
RPS with a computer opponent operating according to the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Human participants were 
not made aware of the specific strategy of the computer at the time of testing, given that the absence of instruc-
tion is important in understanding real-world decision making where information also tends to be incomplete6. 
Response proportions across consecutive trials were examined in terms of the item selected at trial n (Rock, 
Paper, Scissors), the outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw) and the strategy subsequently deployed at trial n + 1 rela-
tive to n (stay, upgrade, downgrade). The distribution of responses across three trials were also examined in terms 
of the strategy deployed between trial n and n + 1 (after4) and between trial n + 1 and n + 2 (stay, upgrade, down-
grade). Any interactions revealed between these levels would undermine the view of human decision making 
as rational and, importantly, define the item-based and outcome-based conditions under which such violations 
could be predicted.
Results
Trial n item selection and outcome. Concerns regarding the violation of normality in the data set were 
addressed by carrying out arc-sine transformations on the proportion data, according to the suggestion of16. The 
formula 2*(ASIN(SQRT(x)) was used when proportion error rates were greater than zero and x represents the 
proportion, and, 2*(ASIN(SQRT(1/2 y))) was used when proportion error rates were equal to zero and y repre-
sented the number of possible observations within a cell. The main effects and interactions of the transformed 
data were equivalent to those generated by the original proportion data. To aid the interpretation of the descrip-
tive statistics, we have retained the primary analysis of proportion data here although both the results from the 
transformed data and raw proportion data can be found in Supplementary Materials.
Using separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors of item selection at trial n (rock, paper, 
scissors) and outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw), respectively, we confirm that participants did not significantly 
differ in terms of their item selection at trial n [F(2, 60) = 1.64, MSE = 368.53, p = 0.203, ƞ p2 = 0.052] or the 
outcome at trial n [F(2, 60) = 1.21, MSE = 94.85, p = 0.306, ƞ p2 = 0.039]. In terms of item selection at trial n, 
there was a non-significant tendency for participants to play Rock (80.10 trials; 35.60%) slightly more often than 
Paper (72.55 trials; 32.24%) or Scissors (72.35 trials; 32.16%). In terms of outcome at trial n, participants had a 
non-significant tendency to win (77.10 trials; 34.27%) slightly more than they drew (73.32 trials; 32.59%) or lost 
(74.58 trials; 33.15%).
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First-order repetition effects. Proportion data using 222 trials (the first trial in each block had no previous 
history) were analysed according to a three-way repeated measures ANOVA using the factors of item selection 
at trial n (rock, paper, scissors), outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw) and strategy at trial n + 1 (stay, downgrade, 
upgrade). Since the strategy at trial n + 1 data were calculated as proportion of both item selection at trial n and 
outcome at trial n, the analysis of these trial n terms (and the resultant interaction) was meaningless (p = 1). The 
main effect of strategy was not significant [F(2, 60) = 2.70, MSE = 0.183, p = 0.075, ƞ p2 = 0.083], nor was the 
three-way interaction between item x outcome x strategy [F(8, 240) = 1.59, MSE = 0.012, p = 0.127, ƞ p2 = 0.050]. 
However, significant two-way interactions between item x strategy [F(4, 120) = 2.71, MSE = 0.048, p = 0.033, 
ƞ p2 = 0.083] and outcome x strategy [F(4, 120) = 6.71, MSE = 0.061, p < 0.001, ƞ p2 = 0.183] were observed. 
Figure 1b shows strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of item selection at trial n, which was decomposed according 
to Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05). Playing Rock at trial n did not seem to impact on strategy at trial n + 1, follow-
ing Paper participants were more likely to switch (either upgrading or downgrading; numerically more likely for 
downgrading) than to stay, and after Scissors there was a preference for switching (specifically upgrading) relative 
to staying.
Figure 1c shows strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of outcome at trial n, which was again decomposed accord-
ing to Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05). No significant differences in trial n + 1 strategy were observed following a win 
although numerically the data were in favour of staying. In contrast, a loss more likely prompted item switching 
than staying (numerically in favour of item downgrading) and following a draw, participants were inclined to 
switch and specifically upgrade their item relative to staying.
Second-order repetition effects. Proportion data using 219 trials (the first 2 trials in each block had no 
immediate second-order history) were analysed according to a two-way repeated measures ANOVAs using the 
factors of strategy at trial n + 1 (stay, downgrade, upgrade) and strategy at trial n + 2 (stay, downgrade, upgrade). 
Proportion data was calculated from strategy at trial n + 1 rendering that main effect meaningless (p = 1). An 
interaction between strategy at trial n + 1 and n + 2 was revealed [F(4, 120) = 13.12, MSE = 0.012, p < 0.001, 
ƞ p2 = 0.304] in the absence of a main effect of strategy at trial n + 2 [F(2, 60) = 2.19, MSE = 0.063, p = 0.121, 
ƞ p2 = 0.068]. As shown in Fig. 1d and decomposed using Tukey’s HSD test (p < 0.05), staying with item selection 
between trial n and n + 1 failed to impact on the strategy adopted between trial n + 1 and n + 2. However, partic-
ipants who upgraded were more likely to continue upgrading and participants who downgraded were more likely 
to continue downgrading.
Discussion
Human participants played RPS against a computer opponent with a mixed-strategy equilibrium2,5. Therefore, 
any deviation from the equal play of each of the three items (Rock, Paper, Scissors) and any predictable change 
Figure 1. (a) Schematic showing the cyclical nature of upgrading or downgrading responses in Rock, Paper, 
Scissors, (b) Graph showing strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of item selection at trial n, (c) Graph showing 
strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of outcome of trial n, (d) Graph showing the strategy adopted between trial 
n + 1 and n + 2 as a function of the strategy adopted between trial n and n + 1.
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in strategy (stay, upgrade, downgrade) as a function of the outcome of the previous trial (win, lose, draw) would 
place the human participant in a potentially exploitable position. The data provide only limited evidence of pri-
mary salience8 in the context of RPS, but nevertheless replicate the observations of4,10,14 in terms of participants’ 
tendency to overplay Rock. In terms of the origin of this effect, anecdotally some participants (and indeed some 
researchers) intuitively believed that Rock was somehow ‘better’ or ‘stronger’ that its Paper and Scissors counter-
parts, despite the fact that this assumption exists nowhere in the structure of the game. Future research examining 
both personal reinforcement history and connotative meaning17 of individual items in RPS might help to account 
for the subjective assumptions associated with favored items. If there is a tendency for Rock to be overplayed, then 
slightly overplaying Paper might be a sensible option against any future opponent6. However, since RPS has no 
evolutionarily stable strategy if the game is played iteratively5 the success of this strategy can only be short lived. 
Interestingly, human participants’ approximation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the light of their opponent 
playing the same strategy runs contrary to the performance of rhesus monkeys. In a simpler matching-pennies 
games7, monkeys adopted a mixed-strategy equilibrium only when the computer’s algorithm adjusted its strat-
egy according to the frequency distribution of the monkey (secondary salience8). When the computer played 
according to a mixed-strategy equilibrium, monkeys deviated from equilibrium. Such decision-making differ-
ences between animals and humans are common and often reflect superior performance in the former (e.g.18 for 
pigeons’ enhanced sensitivity to base-rate information19 for pigeons’ improved performance at the Monty Hall 
problem). Given that decision-making is also partly determined by whether participants believe their opponent 
to be a human or machine20,21, perceived agency continues to be a critical avenue for future human and animal 
research.
In terms of the inter-trial analysis, the data both replicate and give increased specificity to the ‘win-stay, 
lose-shift’ strategy. Although consistent with behaviourist principles, the implementation of such a potentially 
dominated heuristic in recursive, non-cooperative environments places the user in an evolutionarily unsound 
position. As seen in Fig. 1c, there was a non-significant tendency to stay with the previous item selection fol-
lowing a win and to switch (more specifically, downgrade) item selection following a loss15. Such data are consist-
ent with classic behaviourist principles where reinforced responses are more likely to be used again (‘win-stay’) 
and non-reinforced responses are less likely to be used again (‘lose-shift’). However, despite the RPS game space 
assigning equivalent weight to winning or losing (relative to drawing), gains and losses of equivalent magni-
tude do not necessarily have the same subjective value22. That is, the magnitude of difference between the three 
potential strategies was larger following loss than win trials. Therefore, consistent with the initial ideas of22, a loss 
impacts on rational decision making to a greater degree than a win and individuals become more predictable (and 
therefore more vulnerable) in terms of their strategy following a loss trial. Drawing with an opponent leads to the 
same overall strategic consequence than losing (i.e., switch) and so in this respect both losing and drawing may 
index a lack of reinforcement and an unsuccessful outcome (c.f.13). However, the subsequent nature of the switch 
is qualitatively different23: losing promotes downgrading whereas drawing promotes upgrading. Furthermore, 
those tendencies to upgrade or downgrade were perpetuated across three consecutive trials (Fig. 1d) lend credence 
to the idea that there also can be repetition in the nature of change, and that these different forms of switch may 
have quite different cognitive and emotional consequences. This signposts future work examining how specific 
emotions may determine movement away from rational decision making (see24 for a review), and the trial-to-trial 
bases on which these occur (see25 for an exploration of regret aversion on consecutive decision making).
Of final interest are the implications of the lack of a significant three-way interaction between item selection 
at trial n, outcome at trial n and strategy at trial n + 1 during first-order repetition effect analysis. Comparing the 
data across Fig. 1c,d, one can see that both item selection at trial n and outcome at trial n had very similar impacts 
on strategy at trial n + 1. To summarize an additive model of trial n + 1 strategy that combines item selection 
and outcome at trial n, it is possible to select the item at trial n and outcome at trial n that produce the largest 
proportion of responses for each strategy at trial n + 1. Stay responses were associated with selecting Rock relative 
to Paper or Scissors and winning relative to losing or drawing, upgrade responses were associated with selecting 
Scissors and drawing, whereas downgrade responses were associated with picking Paper and losing. It is critical to 
note that in all 3 cases, item selection for the participant at trial n + 1 reliably predicts Rock: participant stay with 
Rock at trial n + 1 following a win, Paper is downgraded (to Rock) following a loss, and Scissors are upgraded (also 
to Rock) following a draw. This final observation reveals a much more surprising (and actually much simpler) 
rule. Unpacking all three contingencies point to the likelihood that if the computer played Scissors on trial n the 
participant would be more likely to play Rock on trial n + 1, irrespective of the item selection and outcome at trial n. 
This might explain the non-significant tendency for participants to play Rock overall.
It is worth noting that, although consistent with previous literature, some of observed effects are small, and 
there may be at least two reasons why this may be so. First, in contrast to other RPS investigations where individ-
uals played a number of opponents4,10, here each participant played only one computerized opponent who acted 
according to the Nash equilibrium. It has been suggested that in a two-player RPS game, conditional probabilities 
should only show minor deviation from 33%26. Furthermore, the use of a computerized opponent who failed to 
take advantage of any player’s vulnerability may have also contributed to a fairly conservative test of irrational 
decision making. We are currently building various computerized versions of RPS strategy that take into account 
the player’s actions to varying degrees and we expect this will accentuate the deviations observed in the current 
data. Second, there was no additional consequence to winning, losing or drawing, other than the immediate 
feedback presented on screen. We are sensitive to the fact that the financial conversion of performance may well 
implicate different levels of activity at specific neural sites (such as the nucleus accumbens) from those associated 
with simple cognitive feedback [e.g.27]. We expect to see greater differentiation between win and loss trials when 
these are associated with a point and/or monetary system.
The enduring appeal of RPS is partly due to the failure to reveal any optimal strategy when the game is 
played recursively. Indeed, any collective strategies revealed here (e.g., overplay of Rock, ‘win-stay, lose-shift’, 
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recursive upgrading and downgrading) could be used by the most savvy RPS player in the development of suit-
able counter-strategies. As such, the RPS framework continues to evolve but remains stable in providing critical 
insights how we deviate from rational decision making. The present study identifies two negative trial outcomes 
(losing and drawing) that make irrational decisions more likely, with each outcome leading to different behav-
ioural change (downgrading and upgrading). Such strategies are also more likely to be perpetuated across multiple 
trial outcomes, assumedly as a result of the constraints of human information processing. Revealed through 
the game space of RPS, the tendency to initiate any form of potentially dominated strategy as a result of the 
micro-emotional responses associated with negative outcome may have more serious implications in other con-
tinuous non-cooperative interactions such as economics and politics.
Method
Participants. 31 undergraduate students (26 female) participated in the study; mean age was 20.23 years 
(SD = 5.66; one participant did not provide their age) and 27 were right-handed. 2 additional participants were 
excluded for recording responses at each trial using paper and pencil, assumedly in a systematic attempt to work 
out the computer’s strategy. Relative to the other participants who used internal working memory only, we felt this 
did not represent the same test of bounded rationality. The study was approved for testing by the Research Ethics 
Board of Ryerson University and the study was carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants, and course credit was offered for participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. Visual representations of a hand making Rock, Paper and Scissors signs sourced 
from the internet were displayed at a visual angle of approximately 4.5° × 4.5° with participants sat approximately 
57 cms away from the screen. All text was white and presented on black background. The presentation of stimuli 
was controlled by PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & Provost, 1993) and responses were recorded using a 
PsyScope Button Box. The PsyScope script is available upon request.
Design and procedure. Following a set of specific on-screen instructions (see Supplementary Materials), 
participants completed 225 trials of RPS separated across 3 blocks of 75 trials. In each block, the computer played 
Rock, Paper and Scissors 25 times in a random order (mixed-strategy equilibrium2,3,7). At each trial, participants 
were prompted to press one of three buttons corresponding to Rock, Paper and Scissors, following the signal 
‘GO!’ At the time of pressing, the computer displayed their selection on the left, the participant’s selection on 
the right for 1000 ms. After a response checking period of 100 ms, feedback was provided for a further 1000 ms 
as to whether the participant won, lost or drew the trial. The next trial started following a 250 ms blank screen. 
Participants were verbally informed that the computer would play in a certain way (which would be revealed 
after the experiment) and that they were to try to beat the computer across the course of the game. Prior to RPS 
completion, participants completed a short mental exercise which was designed to manipulate the perceived 
agency of the computer (see Supplementary Materials). Since this manipulation appeared unsuccessful, data were 
collapsed across agency.
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